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THE FRUSTRATED TURN TO ADVERSARIAL 
PROCEDURE IN ITALY (ITALIAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE CODE OF 1988) 
GIULIO ILLUMINATI* 
I. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF CRIMINAL TRIAL (CODE OF 1930) 
In accord with the continental civil law tradition, the Italian criminal 
justice system has long employed an inquisitorial procedural model. 
Beginning in the nineteenth century, Italian criminal procedure was built 
on the 1808 French Code d’instruction criminelle.1 The Italian Kingdom, 
established in 1861, promulgated the first Italian code of criminal 
procedure, in 1865.2 This code, and the subsequent codification of 1913,3 
were heavily influenced by the Napoleonic Code. 
The Code of 1930,4 drafted in the fascist era, also suffered a strong 
influence from the Napoleonic Code: criminal proceedings were divided 
into two phases, the investigative stage (“istruzione”) and the trial stage 
(“dibattimento”), with the investigative stage holding more influence over 
the proceedings. The Code provided for an investigating judge (“giudice 
istruttore”) with extensive powers. On recommendation of the public 
prosecutor, the investigating judge would direct the investigation in order 
to “ascertain the truth.”5 He would hear witnesses and experts, perform 
searches, seizures and experiments. The investigating judge could also 
summon and question the accused. All the evidence obtained in the course 
of the investigation would be recorded in the investigative dossier, upon 
which the trial judge based his decision. 
Originally the defense was forbidden to participate in the investigative 
phase. Later reforms6 and a series of decisions of the Constitutional Court 
in the 1970s7 allowed the defense opportunities to challenge or contradict 
 * Professor of Criminal Procedure, Head of the Department of Law, University of Bologna; 
Lecturer in Criminal Procedure, L.U.I.S.S. Guido Carli, Rome. 
 1. Code d’instruction criminelle, in LES CINQ CODES DE L’EMPIRE FRANCAISE: REUNIS EN UN 
SEUL VOLUME, SUIVE DE LA TAXE DES FRAIS ET DEPENS (Ferra, Ainé 1812). 
 2. C.P.P. (1865). 
 3. C.P.P. (1913). 
 4. C.P.P. (1930). 
 5. C.P.P., art. 299 (1930). 
 6. Bill n.517/1955 and Decree n.2/1971. 
 7. Corte cost., 10 Dec. 1970, n.190, Gazz. uff. n.324, 23 Dec. 1970; Corte cost., 13 Apr. 1972, 
n.63, Gazz. Uff. n.110, 26 Apr. 1972; Corte cost., 13 Apr. 1972, n.64, Gazz. Uff. n.110, 26 Apr. 1972. 
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information that was gathered. However, confrontational and adversarial 
initiatives were permitted in the trial phase, which took place only if the 
investigation had collected sufficient evidence. The principles of orality8 
and immediacy were granted in court. But those same principles were 
frustrated by the trial judge having access to the investigative dossier and 
being able to base a decision upon the records contained therein. 
It is easy to understand why the preliminary investigative phase served 
as the central process of criminal proceedings, as this was when evidence 
was actually collected. In most cases the trial phase did not add to what 
had been done in the investigative phase or disavow the conclusion 
reached during the investigation. The trial simply functioned as a control 
on what had been previously decided. The trial often turned out to be 
merely an occasion for the “official reading” of the record formed during 
the investigative stage. 
It is true that witnesses could be called to trial to testify and their 
testimony could differ from that given to the investigating judge. But the 
decision still could be based solely on the investigative dossier, 
disregarding the evidence presented during the trial phase. Moreover, in 
most cases the witness was asked to simply “confirm” the statements 
given to the investigating judge. The ability of the trial judge to rely 
exclusively upon the investigative dossier is determinant in establishing 
the inquisitorial profile of this system. 
The Code of 1930 remained in force until 1988.9 Even though many 
amendments were promulgated in an effort to update the procedure, the 
Code of 1930 and its inquisitorial nature was unfit in light of the 
supervening Constitutional system. 
II. THE LINE BETWEEN ACCUSATORIAL AND INQUISITORIAL SYSTEMS 
In order to understand the inquisitorial system of criminal justice (in 
force in Italy from 1930 until 1988 in different graduations), it is important 
to draw a clear distinction between inquisitorial and accusatorial 
procedures. The distinction has suffered a certain loss of significance and 
it is widely discussed, if not considered as being of purely historical 
interest. With no pretense of giving a universally valid definition, we will 
 8. “The principle that evidence must be given orally and subject to cross-examination unless 
affidavit evidence is admissible.” OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LAW (Elizabeth A. Martin ed., 5th ed. 
2002). 
 9. C.P.P. (1988). 
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assume for this report a meaning that is generally agreed upon among 
scholars and lawyers in Italy. 
From a historical perspective, the dividing line between the two models 
derives from the nature of the accuser; a private citizen in the accusatorial 
process as opposed to a public officer in the inquisitorial process. From 
this point of view the distinction is now obsolete, as all countries have 
centralized the duty of prosecution with the state and local government. 
Following another point of view, any system which does not conceive 
of a distinction between judge and prosecutor may be called inquisitorial; 
but this is an out-of-date criterion, as the distinction between the two 
functions is now assured in the majority of countries (at least in western 
democracies). 
The perspective taken in this report views as accusatorial any model 
that strictly separates the investigating phase from the trial. In such a 
model, only the evidence collected in a public trial granting the right of 
confrontation may be used as a basis for the judge’s decision. In contrast, 
under the inquisitorial model, decisions are based on evidence gathered 
unilaterally and in secret during the preliminary investigations by the 
investigating judge. It makes little difference whether the investigation is 
carried out by a judge or rather by a prosecutor, acting either as a party or 
as a neutral officer. 
On the other hand, it must be stressed that an accusatorial process does 
not necessarily imply a full adversarial procedure-trial where the parties 
determine the issues to be decided and the evidence to be presented. The 
adversarial procedure is the best way to ensure the defendant’s right to 
hear and to confront the evidence against him, but it is not the only way. 
At the same time, the existence of a two-sided investigation, in particular 
the right of the defense attorney to carry out a parallel investigation should 
not be a decisive factor in determining a system to be accusatorial. As an 
example, under Italian law, defensive investigation, which had been 
forbidden prior to the 1988 reform, later10 assumed importance equivalent 
to that of the official investigation of the prosecutor in determining the 
outcome. Even so, it is not widely used by lawyers with the only 
preliminary inquiry usually directed by the prosecutor. 
Therefore, an accusatorial process can be regarded as one that draws a 
clear barrier between the investigatory stage and the following trial phase, 
so that at the trial the information collected in the preliminary stage is not 
 10. Law n.397, 7 Dec. 2000, Gazz. Uff. n.2, 3 Jan. 2001. This was introduced as Bill n.397 of 
2000. 
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the basis for the decision. Consequently, it is ensured that evidence will be 
produced and discussed in court, in observance of the principles of orality 
and immediacy. 
Mixed procedure provides for a public trial where the right of 
confrontation can be formally granted, but still allows the judge to base a 
decision on the investigative dossier. In this sense, a mixed procedure is 
substantially inquisitorial. The same conclusion applies to the original 
model of the Napoleonic Code.11 
Applying these definitions, the Italian Code of 193012 could be 
regarded as a kind of mixed procedure; originally was strictly inquisitorial, 
but the Code later shifted to a milder version. In any case, the trial judge 
was entrusted with a truth-seeking duty and could decide on the basis of 
the investigative dossier. A public trial was provided for, but in practice 
served as a mere formality. 
III. THE REVOLUTION OF 1988 
Since the early 1960s, the need for a new procedure better suited to the 
constitutional system established in 1948 was considered essential. The 
Constitution did not impose a precise model for criminal proceedings, but 
an adversarial-accusatorial process better protected the values inherent in 
the Constitution. This was true even before the 1999 amendment to the 
Constitution, which will be discussed below. 
Article 24 section 2 of the Constitution protects the right to counsel, the 
right to an effective defense and the right of the accused to be promptly 
informed of the charge filed.13 Article 27 section 2 requires a presumption 
of innocence, which consequently places the burden of proof upon the 
prosecution and necessitates a cognitive judgment in the ascertainment of 
the facts.14 Article 101 section 2 affirms that judges should obey only the 
law, thus guaranteeing judicial impartiality.15 Judicial impartiality is also 
assured by Article 112, which requires a separation of functions between 
judges and prosecutors.16 Article 101 section 1 is also relevant: it states 
that justice should be administered and given in the name of the Italian 
people.17 It imposes the maximum transparency on the procedures and 
 11. Code d’instruction criminelle, supra note 1. 
 12. C.P.P. (1930). 
 13. COST., art. 24, § 2. 
 14. Id. art. 27, § 2. 
 15. Id. art. 101, § 2. 
 16. Id. art. 112. 
 17. Id. art. 101, § 1. 
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excludes proceedings typical of the inquisitorial model that are held in 
secret. The recognition of these rights necessitated an accusatorial-
adversarial procedure. 
The effort to reform criminal procedure began in the 1960s and was 
promoted by eminent scholars. In 1978, the first reform code was drafted, 
but it did not come to fruition. The criminal reform did not stop its course, 
however, and ten years later a second reform code was successful.18 
The new Code of Criminal Procedure of 1988 represented a revolution, 
inspired by the Anglo-American adversarial system. The break with the 
past was clear: abolition of the investigating judge; preliminary inquiry 
conducted by both parties; adversarial presentation of evidence and cross-
examination at trial; strong reduction of the judge’s ability to introduce 
evidence (limited to the case of absolute necessity, such that he could not 
otherwise decide in favour of either party). Another primary difference is 
the strict separation of the trial phase from the preliminary investigation, 
which had previously been put forth in the 1978 draft reform code. 
The goal was to prevent judicial prejudice founded on knowledge of 
the investigations conducted by the prosecutor and by the police. 
Therefore, the results of the preliminary inquiry were withheld from trial, 
in an attempt to avoid influencing the trial judge. Both the transit of 
investigative files and the narration of the protagonists of the investigation 
were to be forbidden. The strong separation between phases (trial and 
investigation) was ensured by two rules: (1) the prohibition against 
investigative records at trial, except when used to impeach a witness; and 
(2) the prohibition against police testimony at trial regarding the 
statements collected in the investigating stage. 
As to the first rule, the system operates in the following way. At the 
end of the investigation the prosecutor files the charge, which is screened 
by a judge during a preliminary hearing. After sending the accused to trial, 
the same judge forms the dossier for the trial judge. This dossier contains 
very few records taken from the prosecutor’s file including only evidence 
which is objectively impossible to reproduce in court; evidence that may 
be lost before trial; records regarding the corpus delicti; and prior 
convictions of the accused.19 
In other words, the preliminary judge selected from the investigative 
dossier those very few records which the Code allows the trial judge to 
have access to and then placed these records in the distinct trial dossier 
 18. C.P.P. (1988). 
 19. C.P.P., art. 431 (1988). 
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(“fascicolo per il dibattimento”). This system, called the “double dossier-
system” (“doppio fascicolo”), was created in order to avoid bias to the trial 
judge’s “virgin mind,” guaranteeing that the judge would acknowledge 
only the evidence produced in court and decide only on that basis. The 
trial judge is never allowed to look at the prosecutor’s file; out-of-court 
statements could be used only on the issue of the witness’ credibility, 
without any substantive use (that is, to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted therein). In other words, they could never be proper grounds for 
the decision.20 
As to the second rule, it should be pointed out that the Code of 1988 
did permit (and still does) hearsay testimony by ordinary witnesses, 
although providing for a specific discipline.21 The only prohibition on 
hearsay was for the police who had conducted investigations.22 
These two rules were established to guarantee a perfect shield, isolating 
the judge from the information gathered during the investigations. As a 
consequence, the only evidence upon which the judge could ground his 
decision was that presented in court. 
The reason for these rules is not simply that evidence at trial should be 
introduced by the parties. After all, to some extent this happened under the 
Code of 1930. Rather, evidence at trial is evidence that is produced in the 
presence of the other party to allow cross-examination. Moreover, the 
opposing party could contradict the evidence and put forth an opposing 
point of view. Evidence at trial is heard directly by the judge who can 
carefully weigh and evaluate the witnesses’ reactions and, therefore, their 
credibility. In other words, it is evidence collected in accordance with the 
principles of orality and immediacy. 
Of course, some exceptions were introduced to the principle that the 
only legitimate evidence is that produced at the trial, either directly or 
through the reading of the records placed in the trial dossier. In cases 
where the witness had died or it was impossible to call him to testify, the 
Code of 1988 granted the right of using prior statements of the witness.23 
Another exception was introduced for cases where the accused remained 
silent at trial once the other party had requested his examination.24 Besides 
these exceptions, however, the principle that the decision could be based 
 20. C.P.P., art. 500 (1988). 
 21. C.P.P., art. 195 (1988). 
 22. The prohibition of hearsay does not apply to the prosecutor since he cannot testify at all. 
 23. C.P.P., art. 512 (1988). 
 24. C.P.P., art. 513 (1988). 
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solely on in court statements was strict. This displays the clear will of the 
legislature to introduce an accusatorial system.  
However, some features of the traditional continental model have not 
been abandoned. For example, the judge still has the power to introduce 
evidence. No jury trial is provided for and adjudication remains primarily 
in the hands of professional judges (with the pre-existent exception of the 
“court of assise”, a mixed panel composed of six lay judges and two 
professionals, having jurisdiction only over the most serious felonies). The 
decisions require a written statement of the reasons, and there are broad 
rights of appeal. Proceedings commence under the principle of legality (or 
of compulsory prosecution), which excludes any legitimate prosecutorial 
discretion. The prosecutor is asked to investigate both against and in favor 
of the defendant. But these traits are not considered as betraying or 
jeopardizing the accusatorial process. 
IV. CRITICISMS AND 1992 JUDICIAL TURN-OVER 
Transplanting judicial systems across legal cultures is always difficult. 
Success lies on large-scale acceptance of the values implied by the new 
system. When such support is lacking, the risk of rejection is high. The 
fault of the 1988 codification was that it had not been adequately prepared 
in cultural terms. The bar and judiciary were not fully involved in the 
reform. This is especially true for the judiciary, where the deepest changes 
were imposed. 
Italian judges were accustomed to having an almost unlimited power to 
introduce evidence, to having full knowledge of the investigative dossier 
and the freedom to use any document from that dossier for the decision. 
Judges conceived of their role as one of seeking the truth, where they were 
supposed to search in all possible ways and with all the permitted means in 
order to accomplish their duty. Judges were accustomed to being the 
active protagonists of the trial; the focus now shifted to the parties’ 
initiatives and arguments. 
The first criticisms to the new Code were, not surprisingly, made by 
prosecutors and judges concerned over a perceived loss of efficiency. But 
it is apparent that the real disappointment was grounded in a belief that the 
newly introduced accusatorial context was useless. That is to say, the 
same—if not better—results could have been reached more expeditiously 
under the old procedures. It is evident that those who complained of 
inefficiency did not share the same values on how facts should be 
ascertained and how the judge should come to the decision. Yet the way 
justice is administered is as important as the rendering itself. In other 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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words, quantity does not match quality. This cultural diversity soon came 
to surface in the courtrooms. 
The first interpretations given to the provisions of the Code of 1988 
were not in line with the accusatorial spirit. Court decisions tended to 
expand the exceptions to the principle that evidence should only be 
produced in court. Other rulings interpreted expansively the judge’s 
powers to introduce evidence, which the Code had confined into narrow 
limits.25 Many judges challenged the provisions of the Code of 1988, 
alleging that they conflicted with the Constitution. Far more constitutional 
claims came before the Constitutional Court in the first years after the 
reform than were ever referred to the Court during the preceding four 
decades under the provisions of the Code of 1930,26 which had been issued 
in the fascist era before the introduction of the Constitution. 
These remarks demonstrate the failure of the new Code to garner 
general approval. But the strongest attack on the Code came in 1992, when 
the Constitutional Court and the legislature struck down the accusatorial 
construction. 
The Constitutional Court delivered the first hit by tearing down both 
pillars that sustained the accusatorial process. In January of 1992, the 
Court held that the prohibition of hearsay by police officers violated the 
constitutional equality clause, as a similar ban did not apply to other 
witnesses.27 Five months later the Court delivered Decision 254/1992 and 
Decision 255/1992.28 Decision 254/1992 allowed the use of out-of-court 
statements of an accomplice (tried separately) who is called to testify in 
the defendant’s trial. These statements may be used when the accomplice 
does not show up in court or when he invokes the right to remain silent. 
Decision 255/1992 permitted the substantive use of prior statements 
recalled by the parties during cross-examination for impeachment 
purposes. Such statements could be inserted in the trial dossier and the 
judge could base his decision on them. 
The rationale that supported these rulings manifested the underlying 
ideology. On several occasions the Court referred to the duty of the judge 
to seek the truth, noting that such a duty is not subject to restrictions or 
limitations. The Court believes that any opportunity to enhance the judge’s 
knowledge should be permitted. 
 25. Cass., sez. un, 11 June 1992. 
 26. C.P.P. (1930). 
 27. Corte cost., 22 Jan. 1992, n.24, Gazz. Uff., 5 Feb. 1992. 
 28. Corte cost., 18 May 1992, n.254, 103 Racc. uff. corte. cost. 1992; Corte cost., 18 May 1992, 
n.255, 104 Racc. uff. corte. cost. 1992. 
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The Court also recalled the principle of reasonableness.29 The Court 
espoused that a procedure that suffers from such a loss of information is 
unreasonable. The constitutional judges reviewed the existence of an 
implicit constitutional principle, the “principle of non-dispersion of 
evidence.” The principle, in the opinion of the Court, resolved not to waste 
any information available in a case, no matter where it had been collected. 
The principle of non-dispersion disregards the principles of orality and 
immediacy. 
Parliament passed a bill in August of 1992 that implemented the Court 
decisions and increased the exceptions to the rule that the only evidence 
admissible was that collected at trial30. For example, the parties were 
allowed to introduce records of other proceedings31 and decisions taken in 
collateral cases.32 Also, out-of-court statements of witnesses not present at 
trial could be used more extensively.33 This legislation was enacted by the 
State in response to attacks by organized crime. In the same year, two 
leading public prosecutors investigating the Mafia in Sicily had been 
assassinated. This justified the need for emergency legislation aimed at 
strengthening the evidentiary powers available to law enforcement 
officials. 
The end of summer 1992, saw the definitive cancellation of the 
accusatorial process. What remained was a mixed system, which permitted 
extensive use of information gathered by the prosecutor during his 
investigations, while simultaneously denying the judge the power to seek 
“material truth.” This hybrid system, far removed from the accusatorial 
process, failed to affirm the inquisitorial process. Investigative records 
were available for the decision only in some occasions. It is not possible to 
explain the reason for such a disparity. The Court operated by nullifying 
single provisions that collided with the Constitution. This did not permit 
the replacement of accusatorial processes with new inquisitorial ones. 
Replacement was not made by the legislature either. The legislature’s 
intervention was limited to widening the exceptions to the principles of 
orality and immediacy, not assessing the use of the investigative dossier. 
 29. The principle of reasonableness is derived from the equality clause of the Italian 
Constitution. Cost., art. 3. 
 30. Law n.397, 7 Aug. 1992, Gazz. Uff. n.185, 7 Aug. 1992.  
 31. C.P.P., art. 238 (1988), as amended by Law n. 397/1992, supra note 30. 
 32. Id. arts. 238 bis, 511 bis (1988), as above. 
 33. Id. arts. 512 bis-512, 413 (1988), as above. 
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V. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PARLIAMENT AND JUDICIARY 
In 1997, Parliament decided to re-establish the original accusatorial 
choice. Law 267/1997 abolished some of the many exceptions to the 
principles of orality and immediacy in order to place the trial stage at the 
center of criminal proceedings again.34 In particular, the reform stated 
previous statements of an accomplice, are separately inadmissible for 
determining the defendant’s guilt as long as the accomplice remained 
silent at trial.35 
The reform moved toward a restoration of the accusatorial process, 
preserving the defendant’s right of confrontation. However, the 
Constitutional Court reviewed the revised provisions and concluded that 
they were an unconstitutional violation of the equality clause.36 The 
provision forbid the use of an accomplice’s previous statements where the 
accomplice was silent at his trial, but did not forbid the previous statement 
of a witness. The reasons stated for the decision display the ideology of 
the Constitutional Court. The Court again recalled the principle that no 
judicial activities should be wasted and no evidence should be lost.37 
Parliament and the judiciary were now in open conflict and the judiciary 
was prevailing. 
VI. PARLIAMENT’S REACTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
The Constitution, as we have already pointed out, did not prohibit an 
accusatorial system, contrary to the beliefs of the constitutional judges. In 
fact, the Constitution favored a system based on the parties’ initiative and 
on evidence drawn out by cross-examination in front of an impartial judge. 
The Constitutional Court’s systematic misinterpretation of the 
Constitution made it clear that Parliament would have to amend the 
Constitution to explicitly state the intended procedural system. 
Constitutional Law 2/1999 reformed Article 111 of the Constitution by 
introducing five new sections.38 The reform goes under the label “the fair 
trial reform,” as the added provisions state the principles of a fair trial.39 In 
particular, the revised Article 111 states that evidence in criminal cases 
 34. Law n.267, 7 Aug. 1997, Gazz. Uff. n.187, 11 Aug. 1997. 
 35. C.P.P., art. 513 (1988), as amended by Law n. 267/1997, supra note 34. 
 36. Corte cost., 2 Nov. 1998, n.361, Gazz. Uff. la serie speciale, 4 Nov. 1998. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Constitutional Law n.2, 23 Nov. 1999, Gazz. Uff. n.300, 23 Dec. 1999. 
 39. Id. art. 1. These principles correspond to the adversarial and accusatorial model. 
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should only be heard in front of the parties and an impartial judge.40 This 
assures the trial takes center stage in criminal proceedings. 
Additionally, Article 111 grants the accused the right of confrontation 
by the accuser.41 This article provides that guilt can not be proven by 
declarations of the accuser who had not undergone cross-examination by 
the accused or by his lawyer.42 The only exceptions to this rule allow the 
use of out-of-court statements where, the defendant consents, illicit 
conduct of a witness is proven, or obtaining the evidence at trial is not 
possible.43 
VII. THE SUBSEQUENT REFORM OF THE CODE 
After modifying the Constitution, the Code of Criminal Procedure was 
next in line. In 2001, Parliament promulgated Law n. 63/2001.44 This law 
restored most of the provisions struck down by the Constitutional Court in 
1992 including, the prohibition of hearsay by police officers called to 
testify and the inadmissibility of out-of-court statements.45 
As for out-of-court statements, the legislature reintroduced the “golden 
rule” that they shall only be used for the impeachment of witnesses.46 Prior 
statements may only be used substantively where examination of the 
witness is impossible for reasons independent from the parties’ will; when 
the witness has been threatened; when evidence has been tampered with; 
and both parties agree to such use.47 Additionally, an accomplice’s out-of-
court declarations, accusing the defendant, could not be read in trial or be 
put in the trial dossier.48  
To enforce the effectiveness of the right of confrontation, in the Code 
of Criminal Procedure the legislature reproduced the new constitutional 
provisions, which declared that guilt could not be proven solely by 
declarations of the accuser where the defendant or his lawyer has not 
cross-examined the accuser.49  
 40. COST., art. 111, § 2. These principles are referred to as “contraddittorio.” 
 41. Id. § 3. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. § 5. 
 44. Law n.63, 1 Mar. 2001, Gazz. Uff. n.68, 22 Mar. 2001. 
 45. Id. 
 46. C.P.P., art. 500, § 3 (1988), as amended by Law n. 63/2001, supra note 44. 
 47. Id. §§ 4, 6. 
 48. C.P.P, art. 513 (1988), as amended by Law n. 63/2001, supra note 44. The legislature has 
tried to solve this problem by providing that accomplices may be compelled to take the stand as 
witnesses, thus eliminating their right to remain silent about the defendant’s guilt. Such a provision 
guarantees cross-examination and preserves the right of confrontation. 
 49. C.P.P., art. 526, § 1 bis (1988), introduced by Law n. 63/2001, supra note 44. See also Cost., 
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The Constitutional Court examined the recent amendments, with a far 
different result. In Decision 439/2000 the Court confirmed the separation 
between the investigate and the trial phases by refusing to admit prior 
statements of a witness exercising his familial privilege at trial.50 
Decisions 32/2002 and 36/2002 swept away any doubt over the successful 
return to the accusatorial-adversarial system.51 In Decision 32/2002, the 
Court held that the prohibition of hearsay for police officers questioned at 
trial52 is in accord with the Constitution.53 In Decision 36/2002, the Court 
confirmed the constitutionality of the use of prior statements solely for 
impeaching the credibility of a witness.54 This holding certified the 
existence of a barrier between investigation and trial. 
VIII. THE ALTERNATIVE WAY OF “SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS” 
Restoring the accusatorial spirit in the Code of 1988 does not guarantee 
that reality will follow. An accusatorial-adversarial system is hardly 
efficient. Rather, it is a time-consuming and expensive procedure. It 
demands a duplication of activities because the inquiry is significant only 
in view of the trial, where the parties will have to elicit the information 
from the witnesses they have called. Additionally, trials can be lengthy 
proceedings. From this standpoint, the inquisitorial system is cheaper and 
quicker as it solves the issues of guilt with a single investigative effort. 
However, the results and the way results are reached are far different from 
those reached under the accusatorial procedure. Unfortunately, the 
accusatorial procedure needs efficiency. Because cross-examination of the 
witness and the perception of the trial judge are so important, trials should 
be held soon after the alleged crime. Otherwise witnesses might not 
remember important details. 
In light of the difficulties, the Code of 1988 was grafted to 
accommodate a system with a huge backlog. It tried to solve this problem 
by providing many simplified procedural alternatives. These so-called 
“special proceedings” were introduced to shorten and expedite decisions in 
art. 111, § 4. 
 50. Corte cost., 25 Oct. 2000, n.439, Gazz. Uff. la serie speciale, 2 Nov. 2000. 
 51. Corte cost., 26 Feb. 2002, n.32, Gazz. Uff. la serie speciale, 6 Mar. 2002; Corte cost., 26 Feb. 
2002, n.36, Gazz. Uff. la serie speciale, 6 Mar. 2002. 
 52. C.P.P., art. 195, § 4 (1988), as amended by Law n. 63/2001, supra note 44. 
 53. Corte cost., 26 Feb. 2002, n.32, Gazz. Uff. la serie speciale, 6 Mar. 2002; Corte cost., 26 Feb. 
2002, n.36, Gazz. Uff. la serie speciale, 6 Mar. 2002. 
 54. Corte cost., 26 Feb. 2002, n.36, Gazz. Uff. la serie speciale, 6 Mar. 2002. See C.P.P., art. 500, 
§ 2 (1988), as amended by Law n. 63/2001, supra note 44. 
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criminal cases by allowing the avoidance of trials and the preliminary 
hearings when there is strong evidence against the accused. 
To promote judicial efficiency, the Code of 1988 sought to encourage 
the use of consensual procedural alternatives that permitted the avoidance 
of trials. The purpose of these special proceedings was to relieve the 
judicial system of a number of trials that it could not afford to handle. 
One such proceeding is the so-called “patteggiamento” or “deal”55 
where the defendant and the prosecutor agree to a penalty reduced by up to 
one third. The agreed upon penalty cannot exceed five years’ 
imprisonment, implying that crimes that cannot be reduced to five years 
are excluded from the deal. However, as a consequence of the deal, trial is 
avoided. This is similar to common law plea bargaining, although there are 
some significant differences. First, a defendant’s agreement to the deal 
does not equate to a guilty plea. A defendant is not obliged to admit his 
guilt, as this would break the presumption of innocence. Second, the 
powers of the judge also differ in that he must analyze the investigative 
file to verify that there are no grounds for an acquittal nor anything in the 
record proving defendant’s innocence. The judge should also verify that 
the agreed upon penalty is congruent with the nature of the crime charged. 
Another special proceeding available to the defendant is the “giudizio 
abbreviato” or “abbreviated trial,” which is available for any kind of 
crime, regardless of its seriousness. The accused asks to be judged solely 
on the pre-trial file. In other words, the defendant trades off his right to 
trial for a one-third diminution of the eventual penalty he would receive if 
found guilty. The issue of guilt and the extent of the penalty are not parts 
of the deal, and the judge makes such determinations based on the 
investigative dossier. 
For lesser crimes, a prosecutor may request “procedimento per decreto 
penale” or “proceedings by penal decree.” The judge imposes the fine 
based on the investigative dossier. The judge decides in camera, and the 
parties are not present. The defendant is not given a chance to speak, nor 
may he/she introduce evidence. However, he is entitled to a penalty that is 
half of the legally established minimum. Additionally, the defendant can 
oppose the sentence and may request a trial. 
These alternative procedures were created to permit the system to 
afford the accusatorial-adversarial process. The plan was to have no more 
than 20–40% of judicial proceedings follow the ordinary course, leaving 
 55. The formal denomination is “applicazione della pena su richiesta della parti” which, 
translated, means “application of punishment upon the request of the parties.” 
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the rest for the aforementioned expedited alternatives. The expectation was 
to emphasize the consensual proceedings that bypass the trial. 
Another step toward increasing the efficiency of criminal justice has 
been the reform of the judging panels of the tribunal. In 1998, Parliament 
passed a bill that provided that a single judge, rather than the traditional 
panel of three magistrates, would hear most crimes, other than serious 
felonies. This should have allowed courts to handle a greater number of 
proceedings and to reduce the existing backlog. 
Under the same rationale, the legislature granted criminal jurisdiction 
to the justices of the peace over petty offences. This grant of minor 
closeup jurisdiction, beginning in January 2002, should have relieved the 
tribunals of a portion of their heavy caseload. 
IX. THE PRESENT SITUATION 
Existing data can help describe the present situation.56 The jurisdiction 
of the justices of the peace absorbs about 10% of total cases. About 15% 
of decisions are by way of “patteggiamento.” The “giudizio abbreviato” 
handles 10% of the proceedings not dismissed. 
The average length of a criminal trial is less than encouraging. A 
typical case spends 381 days in the prosecutor’s office. Then, after the 
charge is filed, the preliminary hearing takes place 324 days later. The trial 
in front of the tribunal lasts 341 days or 398 days if the trial is in front of 
the “Corte d’assise”, or court of ordinary jurisdiction for very serious 
crimes. Up to 543 days are needed for an appeal. Furthermore, additional 
time may be required if the decision of the court of appeal is submitted to 
the “Corte di cassazione”, or court of last appeal, for review. 
Indeed, efficiency is the primary problem with the Italian justicial 
system; this assertion becomes even more tragically apparent in light of 
the tremendous backlog within the system. Moreover, this scenario exists 
in a system where the financial resources made available to criminal 
justice have always been grossly insufficient. To make things worse, 
financial funds face further reductions. 
The recent attempts by the legislature to stimulate the use of special 
proceedings have not yet achieved significant results in expediting the 
average trial. Furthermore, there is a danger in pushing these special 
proceedings too far, as bargaining for justice may sacrifice the principles 
of legality and the presumption of innocence. On the other hand, the 
 56. The data is taken from the 2003 annual report of the chief prosecutor of the Supreme Court of 
Cassation. 
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proceedings used to expedite criminal justice, notably, those that dismiss 
insignificant offenses are limited in application to juvenile cases and, to 
some extent, to the cases submitted to the justices of the peace. 
The inefficiency of the judicial system raises greater concern. As 
mentioned earlier, the trial, so remote in time from the crime, fails to 
fulfill its role in the fact-finding process. The extended duration of the 
average trial creates an incentive for defendants to avoid consensual 
alternative proceedings in favor of trial, where they can reasonably expect 
to benefit from the statute of limitations. Moreover, no sentence may be 
imposed until final judgment is passed. 
This situation encourages attorneys to employ all possible strategies to 
delay the conclusion of the process, thereby creating a vicious cycle. 
Rather than shortening the length of proceedings, consensual simplified 
proceedings tend to encourage defendants to resort to lengthier trials. 
Reversing this trend would require a considerable investment in the 
administration of justice, which is not, at least for now, the main concern 
of the government. 
CONCLUSION 
After a challenging fight, the accusatorial-adversarial model has now 
been completely assimilated. The accusatorial “return,” however, is better 
in concept than in practice. An accusatorial system that does not work is 
not really accusatorial, especially, if it cannot grant exactly what it should, 
a better way of rendering justice. The present malfunctions in the system 
partially betray the process provided by and codified in the law. 
The first step towards ensuring a working accusatorial system is to 
seriously increase the resources available. The second step presents two 
possible options, either increase the forms of diversion, or drastically 
reduce the number of punishable crimes. A better solution would bring the 
two actions together. 
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